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1. Introduction
Water quality is a serious public health concern for the developed world;
according to the New York Times (Duhigg [2009]), as many as 19 million
Americans become ill due to parasites, viruses, and bacteria in drinking
water each year. The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (SD-
WAA96) require that the public be informed about drinking water contami-
nants through annual reports. We find that the public uses this information:
a report of a water quality violation issued by a local utility induces con-
sumers to be 21% more likely to purchase bottled water in the following
year. This implies about .8 million Americans started drinking bottled wa-
ter because of reported violations.
In the sections that follow, we review the literature on drinking water
quality information (section 2); describe the data (section 3); show our Pro-
bit and two-step Heckman regressions (section 4); and briefly conclude with
policy implications (section 5).
2. Literature
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the relevant academic literature.
Based on a survey of households in Boston, Smith and Desvousges [1986]
report that nearly 30% of their sample self-report that they purchase bottled
water to avoid hazardous waste, and news of hazardous waste statistically
significantly determines bottled water purchases. In a similar study about
Georgia residents, Abrahams et al. [2000] find 23% consider tap water some-
what unsafe or unsafe, and about 32% show their satisfaction with their
water quality. The authors show that concerns about the safety and tap wa-
ter quality are important determinants but, in contrast to our results, they
find notification of local water problems with tap water is not significant
determinant in the decision to buy bottled water. A few years later, unlike
Abrahams et al. [2000], Jakus et al. [2009] found that directly perceived
water quality (taste, smell, clarity) has a greater influence than perceived
risk in prompting people to buy bottled water in the decision. But, all else
equal, those with greater perceived risks are willing to spend more money
on bottled water than those with lower perceived risks.1
In a working paper similar to ours, Zivin et al. [2011] use bottled wa-
ter consumption as a measure of consumer avoidance of tap water in the
presence of SDWAA96 violations and find, like we do, that this impact is
significant. Their measure of bottled water consumption differs from ours:
while we use Consumer Expenditure survey data representative of one third
of the U.S. population, they use data from what appears to be 200 grocery
stores in northern CA and NV (compared to approximately ten thousand
1As a similar vein, by Jakus et al. [2009], people will behave according to their personal
perception of risk and not according to the objective measure risk as calculated by scien-
tists.
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households which we are able to use). They focus on month-by-month an-
nouncements of water violations, and seek an immediate effect of consumer
behavior on bottled water consumption, while we rely on the the annual
Water Quality Reports as the means by which consumers would learn of
violations. Their data, therefore, is richer in the time dimension but sparser
cross-sectionally. They find expenditures on bottled water increased by 17
to 22 percent upon receiving news of a violation, which is comparable of our
result, which finds consumers are 21 more likely to purchase bottled water
upon receiving news of a violation.
Bennear and Olmstead [2008] study the impact of WQRs mailed to con-
sumers brought about by SDWAA96, but look at water suppliers’ response,
not consumer response. They find that utilities required to mail these WQRs
reduced their violations by between 30 and 44%.
According to Jalan et al. [2003], measures of awareness such as schooling
and exposure to mass media have statistically significant effects on adoption
of different home purification methods in India. In contrast to our work,
most researchers have used information measures from non-health related
water quality and reported beliefs about health risks, so has less to say about
a public information campaign such as one as undertaken by the 1996 Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments. Two papers are similar to ours, in that
they involve a public information campaign. Madajewicz et al. [2007] tested
the water in each of 6,500 wells across Bangladesh; they then labeled each
well as safe or unsafe and reported the result to the users of the well: people
with labeled unsafe wells are over four times as likely to change to another
well within one year. Jalan and Somanathan [2008] selected households in
an Indian city, informed people whether their drinking water had tested
positive for fecal contaminant. Non-purifying households who learned that
their water is “dirty” are 11 percentage points more likely to change their
averting behavior than households who received no information.
Apart from a subject of drinking water quality, consumer response to
information that has been addressed in different topics such as eco-labeling
(Teisl et al. [2002]), food safety concerns (Piggott and Marsh [2004]), price
information on water bills (Gaudin [2006]), and different formats of water
quality reports (Johnson [2003]). Generally, they find, like we do, that the
public responds to information about environmental concerns.
3. Data
There are two primary sources of data used in this study: the BLS’s
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)2 and EPA’s Health-Based Violations
of Drinking Water Standards (VIOLATIONS).3 Table 3 contains the variable
means and standard deviations of all variables, broken down by those who
2Available from The Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cex.
3Available from The United State Environmental Protection Agency at http://www.epa.
gov/safewater/databases.
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purchased bottled water versus those who did not. Observations in this
table are households from CEX from 2006 to 2008 who live in geographical
areas which could be mapped to VIOLATIONS
CEX collects information from the nation’s households and families on
their buying habits, income, and household characteristics. The survey con-
sists of two components: a quarterly interview survey and a weekly diary
survey. Largely self-reported values from the quarterly interview survey are
the demographic variables used here. The diary survey provides bottled wa-
ter expenditure (and other expenditure) variables. Respondents are asked to
keep track of all purchases made each day for two consecutive weeks. The
CEX from 2006 to 2008 includes exactly 10,874 households which we are
able to match (see section 3). CEX reports that weekly average expenditure
for bottled water as $1.91 per household unit for all households and $4.83
amoung those who purchased any (see Table 3). The percent of households
who consumed any bottled water rose one percentage point per year from
39% to 41%.
VIOLATIONS is a record of the water quality reports (WQRs) which
were sent or made available by water utilities to consumers. SWDAA96
focuses on public water systems which the EPA defines as not publicly-owned
but rather any water system which provides water for human consumption
through pipes or other constructed conveyances, if such system has at least
15 service connections or regularly serve at least 25 individuals. The 1996
Amendments in the United States require water utilities to issue annual
water quality reports. In particular, community water system must directly
mail their reports to households by July 1 each year if they serve 10,000 or
more people. This water quality report must include health based violations
if violations occur at systems. EPA collects the information, the number
of health based violations of drinking water standards, from public water
utilities.
Our primary dependent variable is bottled water expenditure from the
CEX. The ideal variable would be direct human tap water consumption,
but such data are not available. Aggregate residential tap water consump-
tion data is the closest data which exist, but they include tap water used for
all purposes, including all bathroom uses, laundry, and watering lawns. Di-
rect human consumption, according to American Water Works Association
[1999], is only 15.7% of total usage. Therefore we follow the literature (Smith
and Desvousges [1986], Larson and Gnedenko [1999], Abrahams et al. [2000]
and Jakus et al. [2009]) and use bottled water consumption as a substitute
for direct human consumption of tap water.
Our primary explanatory variable is the number of reported health viola-
tions from VIOLATIONS. The observations in these data are public water
systems (defined above).
The EPA defines three types of public water systems, only one of which
considered in this study: community water systems, which supply water to
the same population year-round. The excluded utilities are non-transient
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non-community water systems and transient non-community water systems
which provide water either not year-round or not the same population, such
as schools, factories, gas stations, or campgrounds. According to United
States Environmental Protection Agency [2009], there are approximately
52,000 community water systems.
SWDAA96 requires that water utilities which serve 10,000 or more people
to directly mail their annual water quality reports to their households by
July 1 each year and post the reports online.4 Water utilities which serve
fewer than 10,000 people need only post on-line or in local newspapers. We
restrict our analysis to community water systems which serve more than
10,000 people. Although these two restrictions limit us to only 2.7% of all
water systems in the U.S., they serve 78% of the U.S. population.
To construct our data, we had to map utility-level VIOLATIONS data to
household-level CEX data. We used two two criteria: time and geography.
Time: CEX households in each year (2006, 2007, 2008) are matched to
VIOLATIONS from the previous year (2005, 2006, 2007). A, for exam-
ple, 2007 VIOLATIONS observation contains the data which were sent to
consumers in 2008; therefore, we match with 2008 CEX data.
Geography: The key geographic matching variable is county: The CEX
has sampling units which contain counties, and water utilities serve coun-
ties. Given our data structure, we compute an expected number of violations
for each CEX household, given their location. CEX provides codes for the
largest 21 Primary Sampling Units or PSUs, which similar to MSAs. See
figure 1 for a U.S. map of the 21 PSUs; note that the largest US cities are
covered about one-third of the US population lives in one of these PSUs.
VIOLATIONS provide the counties that utilities serve, so we requested a
list of counties in each PSU from BLS. Then we constructed the expected
number of reported violations each person in a PSU received by: (a) multi-
plying the population served by each utility by the number of violations by
each utility; (b) adding this poplation-weighed number of violations across
all utilities which serve counties in a given PSU; and then (c) dividing this
sum of population-weighted number of violations by the population of the
PSU. Formally, consider suppose utilities u = 1, . . . , U are in a given PSU
PSUA. Let popu be the population served by utility u and let viou be the
number of violations by utility u. Then, for all individuals i who live in
PSUA, let
violationsi =
∑U
u=1
(
popuviou
)∑U
u=1 popu
(1)
=⇒ violationsi = E
(
violations|individual i lives in PSUA
)
(2)
4Office of water (4604), Public access to information & public involvement in EPA 816-F-
04-039 June 2004
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Two notes about the geographical match. First, since we use only PSUs,
the sample is weighted toward urban households and thus may not accu-
rately describe rural Americans. Second, the violations variable measures a
probability that the household received a WQR which indicated a violation,
instead of certainty that the household received such a WQR. This means
the data likely underestimates the true impact of WQRs on bottled water
purchases. The geographic restriction to PSUs further limits the data to
32% of valid community water systems, which as mentioned above, serve
about one-third of the U.S. population.
Table 4 shows the number of household sampled, the number of water
utilities that serve ≥ 10, 000 population, 10, 000 or more populations served
by the water utilities, and average 10, 000 or more population served by wa-
ter utilities with Violations over three years in the study. At least one time,
10.37 % of people received water quality reports with violations from 2006
to 2008.
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Figure 1. U.S. Map: Population by the 21 PSUs Served by
Water Utilities in County Level
4. Empirical Analysis
Consumers directly receive water quality reports, news of health viola-
tions in drinking water, from their water utilities annually. If a consumer
receives the report containing many health violations and read these poten-
tial health effects of any detected contaminant level that violates drinking
water quality standard, she may find tap water less appealing for direct con-
sumption. If so, provision of water quality information induces those who
receive violations for drinking water to start finding alternatives to water
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Table 4. Percent of Household Sampled by PSUs
21 PSU Number of Number of a pop1b pop2c
Code Household Sampled(%) Water Utilities
1102 592(5.44) 85 5,745,896 317,251
1103 740(6.81) 162 8,447,005 351,798
1109 584(5.37) 3 8,070,718 5,368,479
1110 796(7.32) 92 6,116,332 850,200
1111 588(5.41) 113 6,270,762 409,193
1207 1,170(10.76) 171 8,212,501 486,398
1208 593(5.45) 89 4,366,684 48,010
1210 292(2.69) 31 2,787,723 100,000
1211 295(2.71) 62 2,649,979 145,325
1312 460(4.23) 31 4,590,334 402,500
1313 262(2.41) 14 2,442,626 105,385
1316 512(4.71) 73 5,657,220 122,000
1318 406(3.73) 59 4,244,811 71,277
1319 366(3.37) 45 4,535,247 125,991
1320 373(3.43) 28 1,771,896 16,090
1419 1,026(9.44) 64 4,443,397 34,518
1420 377(3.47) 48 3,157,317 70,074
1422 531(4.88) 32 4,207,028 131,563
1423 367(3.38) 63 3,392,230 134,763
1424 220(2.02) 20 4,515,463 -d
1429 324(2.98) 31 3,863,602 299,245
Total 10,874(100.00) 1316 99,488,771 9,590,058
aNumber of water utilities that serve ≥ 10, 000
bpop1: 10,000 or more population served by water utilities in the United States.
cpop2: Average 10,000 or more population served by water utilities with Violations over
three years, 2005-2007
dThere are no violations reported
for avoiding consumption of low quality water. In the study, we consider
bottled water as an alternative to tap water.
Our principal hypothesis is that news of health violations in drinking
water causes consumers to purchase bottled water; i.e. along the exten-
sive margin. To test our hypothesis, we take a standard Probit approach.
Namely:
Pr(y = 1) = Φ(β1 + βi2xi2 + ...+ βKxiK) = Φ(x
′
iβ) (3)
where Pr(y = 1) is 1 if consumer i decides to buy bottled water and 0 if the
consumer decides not to buy bottled water. Φ(·) is the CDF of the normal
distribution function. x
′
i is the vector of variables explaining the probability
of buying bottled water. β is a parameter vector to be estimated.
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Table 5. Estimated Coefficients in Probit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std.Err) (Std.Err) (Std.Err)a
Violation –.0273 .1498 .2058
(.0443) (.0793) * (.0819) **b
Familysize .0368 .0323 .0393
(.0109) *** (.0110) *** (.0110) ***
Income($K) .0006 .0006 .0007
(.0002) *** (.0002) *** (.0002) ***
Education .0132 .0154 .0162
(.0051) *** (.0051) *** (.0051) ***
AgeHH –.0034 –.0033 –.0030
(.0012) *** (.0012) *** (.0012) ***
HH64Dummy .0024 –.0023 –.0117
(.0435) (.0438) (.0439)
Child5Dummy .0145 .0154 .0151
(.0060) ** (.0061) ** (.0061 ) **
WhiteDummy .0344 .0299 .0273
(.0138) ** (.0140) ** (.0141) *
ExpTea($) –.0130
(.0039) ***
ExpOther($) –.0293
(.0041) ***
TimeTrend .0447
(.0155) ***
PSU Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Constant –.5133 –.4245 –.4627
(.0964) *** (.1196) *** (.1244) ***
No. of households 10874 10874 10874
Pseudo-R2 .008 .018 .023
Log likelihood –7245.316 –7176.381 –7138.379
LR Chi2 124.184 262.053 338.057
Prob>Chi2 .000 .000 .000
aStandard errors are in parentheses
bStar,*, indicates statistical significance at p < 0.10, ** at p < 0.05, and *** at p < 0.01
Table 5 shows the results of three different Probit models. Model 1 ex-
cludes PSU fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 exclude two expenditure variables
for tea and coffee and other nonalcoholic beverages. In Model 3, we add a
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Table 6. Estimated Marginal Effect (Model 3)
dy/dx Std.Err X-bar
Violation .0792 .0315 **a .1315
Familysize .0151 .0042 *** 2.7674
Income($K) .0003 .0001 *** 80.0433
Education .0062 .0020 *** 14.0837
AgeHH –.0012 .0004 *** 48.0109
HH64Dummy –.0045 .0169 .1960
Child5Dummy .0058 .0023 ** 2.0829
WhiteDummy .0105 .0054 * 1.3441
ExpTea($) –.0050 .0015 *** 1.8412
ExpOther($) –.0113 .0016 *** 2.8648
TimeTrend .0172 .0060 *** 1.9862
PSU Fixed Effects Yes
a* indicates statistical significance at p < 0.10, ** at p < 0.05,
and *** at p < 0.01
time trend variable.5 Table 6 displays the estimated marginal effects at the
mean associated with the parameter values. We found that the coefficients
on Violation variables in Model 2 and Model 3 are positive and statistically
significant; this indicates that the effect of more violation reports increases
the likelihood that people buy bottled water. In Model 3, the marginal ef-
fects give the increase in likelihood of buying bottled water by 0.08 for those
who received water quality violation report. Table 7 reports the results of
the predicted probabilities for purchasing bottled water in the specification
of the model 3. (The violation variable is set to 0, 1, and 2, and the other
independent variables set at the sample average values.) We ask: what is
the estimated increase in the probability of purchasing bottled water as the
number of violations reported increases from zero to one? We get roughly
0.4646 - 0.3841 = 0.0805. This means that the probability of switching to
drinking bottled water is about 8 percentage points (21%) higher when con-
sumers received a report of a water quality violation. As shown in Table
4, average population served by water utilities with violations reported over
three years, 2005-2007, were about 9,600,000. It implies that about 768,000
people started drinking bottled water because of violations holding all other
factors constant.
Household income is positively and statistically related to expenditures on
bottled water. Marginal effects give the increases in the expected people’s
expenditure on bottled water by 0.0003 with a $1,000 increase in annual
income, and by 0.015 for the family which has more members than the
family which has less. While the dummy variable of head of households
5We also add Quarter dummies as well as time trend variable. The result are almost same
as in Model3.
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Table 7. Predicted Probabilities of Purchasing Bottled Wa-
ter
x =Violation Pr(y=1| x) 95% Conf. Interval
0 0.3841 [ 0.3718, 0.3964]
1 0.4646 [ 0.4084, 0.5207]
2 0.5465 [ 0.4273, 0.6656]
over 64 years old are not statistically significant, the number of members
in consumer unit, Family size, are positive and statistically significant. The
coefficients on AgeHH are negative and statistically significant, indicating
that older people are less likely to spend their money on buying bottled
water than those who are younger. Household with children are more likely
to consume bottled water than those who are with no children. More edu-
cated people are more likely to purchase bottled water than people with less
education. About both expenditures on tea and other nonalcoholic bever-
ages, results indicate that consumer’s expenditures for them are negatively
related to the probability of buying bottled water, suggesting these other
beverage are gross substitutes for bottled water.
We ran the Probit regression with lagged population weighted violations,
which were not statistically significant.
4.1. The impact on the amount of bottled water purchased (the
intensive margin). In the previous analysis, we established that receiving
news of health violations in drinking water increases consumers’ probability
of purchasing bottled water. One way also ask: does the news of violations
increase the amount of bottled water purchased? To investigate this ques-
tion, we use the two-step procedure by Heckman [1979]. In first step, using
model 3 in Table 5, we ran a probit model: decision equation for the decision
to spend. In second step, we ran an ordinary least squares model to predict
expenditure. To get the full effects of water quality information on purchas-
ing bottled water, we obtained the inverse of the Mill’s ratio from probit
model. Then, we augmented the expenditure regression equation with the
inverse of the Mill’s ratio. Thus, we can derive consistent estimates of the
regression disturbance variance. Appendix A reports the results of bottled
water expenditure in these models. The two specifications in models for
both probit model and ordinary least square model are the same. In the
model 2, we performed bootstrap estimation in second step to obtain con-
sistent estimates of standard errors. We found that Violation from water
quality reports is statistically significant in model 2 unlike model 1. We
could say that people’s weekly average expenditure to purchase bottled wa-
ter increases $0.78 by one more violation. The coefficient on lambda term
14 MI SUK SEO AND ANDREAS DUUS PAPE JANUARY 2011
(the inverse of the Mill’s ratio) suggests that the error terms in decision
regression and expenditure regression are positively correlated.
5. Conclusion
Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 2006 to 2008, this paper
offers direct micro-level information on an actual action that households are
undertaken to avoid or reduce the effects of consumption of bad tap water
quality. The main purpose of this paper is to test whether receiving news of
health violations in drinking water increases consumers’ probability of pur-
chasing bottled water. About 40 percent of our sample was weekly percent
reporting any bottle water and weekly average expenditure for bottled water
was $4.83 per household unit. We found that one reported water quality
violation increases the likelihood that individuals buy bottled water about
8 percentage points, or 21%, higher. It implies that about 768,000 people in
the study started drinking bottled water because of water quality violations.
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Appendix A. Bottled Water Expenditures in Heckman Models
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Coef.
( Std.Err)a (Bootstrap)b
Violation .7821 .7821
(.5254) (.4010) *c
Familysize .2491 .2491
(.0560) *** (.0557) ***
Income ($K) .0075 .0075
(.0011) *** (.0015) ***
TimeTrend .4076 .4076
(.0942) *** (.0870) ***
lambdad 4.7420 4.7420
(.8661) *** (.9228) ***
PSU Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Constant –3.1064 –2.8162
(1.3697) ** (1.0208) ***
No. of obs. 4323 4323
F Statistics 6.599
Wald Chi2 218.78
Prob>Chi2 .000 .000
R-squared .037 .037
Adjusted R-squared .031 .031
aStandard errors are in parentheses
bTo obtain consistent estimates of standard errors, we performed boot-
strap estimation
c* indicates statistical significance at p < 0.10, ** at p < 0.05, and ***
at p < 0.01
dlambda is the inverse of the Mill’s ratio obtained from Probit model
16
Appendix B. List of PSU’s Geographic Areas in the CE Survey
PSU PSU Name Region/Definition (County,State)a
NORTHEAST
A109 New York, NY Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond, NY
A110 New York-Connecticut- Fairfield, Hartford, Litchfield, Middlesex,
Suburbs New Haven, Tolland, CT; Dutchess, Nassau, Orange,
Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, Westchester, NY
A111 New Jersey Suburbs Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Mercer,
Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic,
Somerset, Sussex, Union, Warren, NJ
A102 Philadelphia-Wilmington- New Castle, DE; Cecil, MD; Atlantic, Burlington,
Atlantic-City, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester,
PA-NJ-DE-MD Salem, NJ; Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery,
Philadelphia, PA
A103 Boston-Brockton-Nashua, Windham, CT; Bristol, Essex, Hampden, Hampshire,
MA-NH-ME-CT Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Suffolk, Worcester, MA;
York, ME; Hillsborough, Merrimack, Rockingham,
Strafford, NH
MIDWEST
A207 Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, Cook, DeKalb, Du Page, Grundy, Kane, Kankakee,
IL-IN-WI Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Will, IL; Lake, Newton,
Porter, IN; Kenosha, WI
A208 Detroit-Ann-Arbor-Flint, Genesee, Lapeer, Lenawee, Livingston, Macomb,
MI Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw, Wayne, MI
A210 Cleveland-Akron, OH Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, Medina,
Portage, Summit, OH
A211 Minneapolis- Anoka, Benton, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin,
St. Paul, MN-WI Isanti, Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne, Stearns, Washington,
Wright, MN; Pierce, St. Croix, WI
SOUTH
A312 Washington, District of Columbia, DC; Calvert, Charles, Frederick,
DC-MD-VA-WV Montgomery, Prince George?s, Washington, MD;
Alexandria city, Arlington, Clarke, Fairfax, Fairfax city,
Falls Church city, Fauquier, Fredericksburg city,
King George, Loudoun, Manassas Park city, Manassas city,
Prince William, Rappahannock, Spotsylvania, Stafford,
Warren, VA; Berkeley, Jefferson, WV
A313 Baltimore, MD Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Baltimore city, Carroll, Harford,
Howard, Queen Anne’s, MD
A316 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX Collin, Dallas, Delta, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hood, Hunt,
Johnson, Kaufman, Parker, Rockwall, Tarrant, Wise, TX
A318 Houston-Galveston- Austin, Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris,
Brazoria, TX Liberty, Montgomery, San Jacinto, Waller, TX
A319 Atlanta, GA Cleburne, AL; Barrow, Bartow, Butts, Carroll, Cherokee,
Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, Dawson, De Kalb, Douglas, Fayette,
Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Haralson, Henry, Newton,
Paulding, Pickens, Pike, Rockdale, Spalding, Walton, GA
A320 Miami-Fort Lauderdale Broward, Miami Dade, FL
WEST
A419 Los Angeles-Orange, CA Los Angeles, Orange, CA
A420 Los Angeles Suburbs, CA Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, CA
A422 San Francisco-Oakland- Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco,
San Jose, CA San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, CA
A423 Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton Island, King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, Thurston, WA
A424 San Diego, CA San Diego, CA
A429 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ Maricopa, Pinal, AZ
a2000 Census-Based Sample Design(starting in 2005)
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